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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
THOMAS M. VIGIL,
:

Case No. 940614-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ASK QUESTION 27
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.

In response to Mr. Vigil's contention that the trial
court erred in refusing to ask the prospective jurors requested
voir dire question 27,x the State argues that this Court should
not address the merits of the issue because Mr. Vigil has failed
to provide legal authority in support of the question, and has
failed to demonstrate how trial counsel was hampered in
exercising peremptory and for cause challenges as a result of the
trial court's failure to ask the question.

State's brief at 20-

21.

Question 27 stated,
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to
the conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you
found that a majority of the jurors believed the
defendant was guilty, would you change your verdict
only because you were in the'minority?
(R. 709) .

The legal authority demonstrating that the trial court
should have asked the question is found on pages 13 through 14 of
Mr. Vigil's opening brief. As noted on page 14 of the brief,
U

A11 that is necessary for a voir dire question to be appropriate

is that it allow 'defense counsel to exercise peremptory
challenges more intelligently.'"

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839,

845 (Utah 1988)(citation omitted).
Mr. Vigil's explanation of how the trial court's
failure to ask the question hampered trial counsel's ability to
exercise peremptory and for cause challenges appears on page 15
of Mr. Vigil's opening brief.

As noted on page 15 of the brief,

the voir dire was inadequate in the absence of the trial court's
asking question 27 because "the voir dire never addressed ...
whether [the prospective jurors] would maintain their
independence in the deliberation process, or succumb to pressure
from the majority."
The State argues on the merits regarding question 27
that Mr. Vigil has failed to demonstrate that asking question 27
would have revealed any biases.

State's brief at 21. Mr.. Vigil

has no burden to make such a showing.

The question is not

designed to address bias, but is designed to assess the jurors'
ability to maintain independence in the face of peer pressure
during jury deliberations.

Under Worthen, the question would

have assisted Mr. Vigil in exercising his peremptory and for
cause challenges, and the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to ask it.
2

The State argues that "the multitude of questions posed
by the trial court during voir dire provided ample insight into
the jury pool to allow counsel to meaningfully evaluate each
potential juror."

State's brief at 21. The State not only fails

to isolate any particular question asked by the trial court
coming anywhere close to the content of question 27, but also
fails to cite to the record.2

This shortcoming is likely

explained by the fact that the record does not contain one
question asked by the trial court which paralleled or substituted
for question 27.
Because the trial court failed to ask this requested
question that would have provided meaningful assistance to Mr.
Vigil in his exercise of peremptory and for cause challenges, or
any question covering the substance of question 27, Mr. Vigil is
entitled to a new trial. Worthen.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ASK QUESTION 28
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.

In addressing the trial court's failure to ask question
28,3 the State argues, again without citing to the record, that

Such argument falls short of that legitimately
expected and required of advocates appearing before this Court.
See Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144
(Utah 1978)("This Court need not, and will not, consider any
facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record.").
3

Question 28 inquired,
Are there any of you who are not in such a fair
and impartial state of mind that you would not be
satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental state
judge the evidence if you or your loved ones were on
trial here? In other words, would you want someone
with your state of mind sitting as a juror on this case
3

the overall voir dire was generally adequate to address the
potential jurors' fairness and impartiality because the trial
court asked the jurors several specific questions. State's brief
at 21-22.
While the trial court did ask several questions which
may have elicited answers regarding specific biases addressed in
the questions, the trial court did not ask one question as broad
as question 28, which is designed to give the jurors the
opportunity to reveal the biases or weaknesses that the jurors
were aware of that the trial court and parties may not have
anticipated in drafting specific questions.

There were no

questions asked that adequately substituted for question 28.
The State indicates question 28 was covered in
substance when the trial court stated,
Members of the jury panel, let me also
say to you that I hope by now certainly you
have got the impression that it is going to
be your responsibility to be fair and
impartial to both sides of this particular
lawsuit.
State's brief at 22, quoting R. 701.
This argument misunderstands the fundamentally
inquisitive nature of voir dire. Voir dire is supposed to be a
sensitive probing inquiry, to cull from the jurors blatant and
latent biases. See e.g. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-856
(Utah 1988).

A trial court's admonition to prospective jurors

trial here? In other words, would you want someone
with your state of mind sitting as a juror on this case
if you were the defendant?
(R. 709).
4

that it is their responsibility to be fair and impartial is no
substitute for a general question asking the jurors to reveal
their known biases.
C.

Id.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO EXAMINE FURTHER THOSE
POTENTIAL JURORS EXPOSED TO MEDIA COVERAGE
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.

In response to Mr. Vigil's contention that the trial
court committed reversible error in refusing to examine jurors
Wylie and Reese in camera,

the State argues that the voir dire of

these jurors was adequate under State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201
(Utah App. 1992).

State's brief at 23-27.

In Ontiveros, two prospective jurors who ended up
serving on the jury were exposed to media coverage of Mr.
Ontiveros' case. .Id. at 205. They could not remember any
details, and the trial court asked three separate follow up
questions to determine that the jurors would not be biased as a
result of the media coverage. JEd. at 205.

In affirming the

trial court, this Court indicated that trial courts generally
should conduct voir dire with an eye toward safeguarding the
defendants' constitutional rights to fair trials, but found that
in Mr. Ontiveros' case, the trial court's voir dire was adequate,
and that further voir dire would have risked improperly exposing
the jurors to facts about the case. Id.
In contrast, the record in this case demonstrates that
two jurors were exposed to media coverage of attempted adoptions,
and indicates that both jurors recalled at least some details of

5

what they had seen and read.4

The trial court asked one of these

jurors only one follow up question asking her to assess her own
partiality,5 and did not obtain a straight answer from the other
juror in asking her three follow-up questions.

Comparison of

4

The State cites to pages 714-17 of the record,
contending that the trial court "asked the potential jurors if
they had been exposed to media accounts of adoption proceedings
and questioned those jurors who indicated they had seen such
stories, where they had seen them, what they remember about the
stories, and whether they would be influenced by what they had
seen or heard." State's brief at 27 n.4 f2. Pages 714 to 717 of
the record do not support this representation, and are included
in Appendix 1 to this brief.
The record demonstrates that prospective juror Wylie had
seen a program somewhere within six months prior to trial, and
had read a magazine article about the subject (R. 715). The
colloquy was as follows:
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms.
Wylie, As a result of the documentary or the article
in the magazine, and considering the nature of today's
case, would any of that information interfere with your
responsibility to be fair and impartial?
MS. WYLIE: No, not really.
THE COURT: You are certain you could remain fair
and impartial to both sides of this case?
MS. WYLIE: I think, yes.
THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word "think."
Do you have a hesitation?
MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in that
detail, you know. I think I can listen impartially.
(R. 715-716).
Prospective juror Reese said that she had seen a show called
"Attempted Adoption," wherein a "child was up for adoption and
then their minds were changed and the natural parents got the
child back." (R. 717). When the court asked,"Would any of that
information interfere with your abilities to be fair and
impartial to both sides of this lawsuit?" she answered, uNo."(R.
717) .
5

This Court has previously recognized that it is the trial
court's responsibility to craft specific and probing questions to
assess juror bias, rather than to ask jurors to assess their own
biases. E.g. State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
6

this case to Ontiveros thus demonstrates that the trial court
abused his discretion and that a new trial is in order.
II.

THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW
TRIAL.

The State maintains that the trial court was correct in
giving Jury Instruction 28.6 State's brief at 27-36.

Where Mr.

Vigil contends that there was no reliance and hence no theft by
deception in the context of this case because the prospective
adoptive parents by statute gave the Vigils money as a charitable
contribution, knowing that they could not buy the Vigils' consent
to the adoption, the State argues that theft by deception did
occur, because in giving the Vigils the charitable contributions,
the prospective adoptive couples relied on the Vigil's statements

6

Instruction No. 28 provided,
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation
may pay maternity expenses, related medical or
hospital, and necessary living expenses of the mother
preceding and during confinement. However, that act of
paying is by law considered an act of charity and may
not be made for the purpose of inducing the mother,
parent or legal guardian to place the child for
adoption, consent to an adoption, or cooperate in the
completion of an adoption.
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his
or her child is a personal and private act of that
person and may not be bought or bartered for under the
law. A natural parent at any time may choose not to
consent to an adoption. By so choosing, that person
does not subject himself or herself to criminal
responsibility unless you find from the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the
offense of Theft by Deception, as charged in the
Informations have been established.
(Emphasis added).
As trial counsel noted, the instruction was incorrect in
grafting a theft by deception exception onto the statute
mandating that all monies given to birth piothers are charitable
contributions, Utah Code Ann. section 7 6 T 7 - 2 0 3 (R. 1170-71) .
7

that they intended to give their baby up for adoption.

State's

brief at 30-31.
Because this interpretation of the prospective adoptive
parents' contributions renders the contributions conditional, it
seems inconsistent with the law requiring the contributions to be
charitable donations.7
Assuming the State's argument to be correct, these
facts still do not constitute theft by deception because all of
the representations of the Vigils' intent to give their baby up
for adoption had no pecuniary significance as a matter of fact or
law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (2)("Theft by deception does
not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to matters
having no pecuniary significance[.]"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7203(proscribing the selling of children), supra, n 7.
The State has not addressed this point anywhere in its
brief.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-203 provides,
Any person, while having custody, care, control,
or possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of,
or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
However, this section does not prohibit any person,
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of
the mother preceding and during confinement as an act
of charity, so long as payment is not made for the
purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or legal
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an
adoption.
8

Yet, the State concedes that trial counsel preserved
their objection to Instruction 28.

State's brief at 33.

In instructing the jury that theft by deception can
occur in the context of an adoption, Instruction 28 misstated the
law.

Given that the Instruction was the crux of the whole case,

the Instruction was prejudicial to Mr. Vigil, and the conviction
cannot stand.

See State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560

(Utah

App.)("[B]eyond the substantive scope, correctness and clarity of
the jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity is
left to the sound discretion of the trial court.'

However, said

instructions must not incorrectly or misleadingly state material
rules of law.")(citation omitted), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516
(Utah 1992).
III. MR. VIGIL SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE
IN A NEW TRIAL.
The State argues that the trial court correctly
excluded the testimony of Rolland Oliver and in refusing the
requested Jury Instructions 8 because the testimony and

The trial court refused to give the following two requested
Instructions:
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client will be directly adverse
to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:

9

instructions were irrelevant. State's brief at 36-46.
The State argues that Rolland Oliver's testimony and
the Jury Instructions were irrelevant because they did not
pertain to Mr. Vigil's criminal intent under the theft by
deception statute.

State's brief at 40-41, 45-46.

Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-401 and 405, the State was
required to show that Mr. Vigil intentionally took the property
of the prospective adoptive parents by means of intentional
deceit. See State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App.
1994).

In seeking to prove this, the State relied heavily on the

fact that the Vigils were involved with three adoptive couples,

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after
consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
(R. 2 9 5 ) .
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which
the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client[;]
(2) the client is given a reasonable
opportunity to seek the advi[c]e of
independent counsel in the transaction [;] and
(3) the client consents in writing
thereto.
(R. 2 9 6 ) .
10

arguing that the Vigils acted with intentional deceit because
they could not have honestly intended to give their baby up for
adoption to three different couples (R. 1175; 1308).
The essence of Mr. Vigil's defense was that he became
involved with the three couples because of the inadequate
services provided by the first two attorneys, Bushman and Giffen,
and not because he intended to take the property by means of
deceit (R. 1297-1301).

Rolland Oliver's testimony would have

explained norms of adoption proceedings, and thus elucidated the
shortcomings of the attorneys' performance (R. 1151-1158).

The

Jury Instructions similarly would have clarified shortcomings in
the attorneys' performance that the non-law-trained jury may
otherwise have failed to appreciate.
Because the evidence would have made less probable the
State's assertion that the Vigils acted by means of deception or
with the intent to deceive, the evidence was relevant under Utah
Rules of Evidence 402. The Jury Instructions were relevant to
the defense in the very same way.
The State argues that the trial court properly excluded
the evidence under Rule 403, because of the limited relevance of
the evidence in the State's view, and the likelihood that the
evidence would have misled the jury.

State's brief at 42-43.

In

so arguing, the State does not contest the fact that the evidence
was presumptively admissible.

See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,

1221-22 (Utah 1993).
The State suggests that the evidence was properly
11

excluded because the presentation of the evidence would have
required "a trial within a trial" concerning proper adoption
proceedings, and cites State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268 (Utah
App. 1996), for the proposition that the trial court was not
acting "beyond the limits of reasonability" in excluding the
evidence.

State's brief at 43.
Lindgren actually demonstrates that the trial court's

exclusion of the evidence constitutes reversible error.

The case

recognizes that *[a] criminal defendant has the right to
introduce evidence tending to disprove his or her specific intent
to commit a crime [,] . . . even if it is not particularly
strong."

Id. at 1271.

The Lindgren opinion demonstrates that

unless the proffered evidence pertaining to specific intent is
cumulative to other evidence presented, the trial court should
admit the same, and may ameliorate any confusion of the issues
for the jury by giving the jury limiting instructions.

Id. at

1273.
Because Mr. Oliver's testimony was not cumulative to
the evidence presented and was essential to Mr. Vigil's defense
that he was involved with the three couples as a result of
difficulties with the performance of the attorneys, rather than
as a result of an intent to deceive, the Court committed
reversible error in excluding the evidence.

Id.

The trial court's failure to give the Instructions
embodying the theory of the defense also requires a new trial.
State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992)(u[T]he
12

defendant has a right to have his or her theory of the case
presented to the jury in a clear and comprehensible
manner.")(citation omitted).
IV-

THE ABSENCE OF PROPER DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.

The State does not contest Mr. Vigil's argument that
the trial court should have instructed the jury that "Theft by
deception does not occur ... when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance[.]" Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-405(2).

See page 35 of Mr. Vigil's opening brief.

The State does not contest Mr. Vigil's argument that this
omission was prejudicial error which should be addressed through
the plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrines.

See Mr. Vigil's opening brief at 35-38.
Mr. Vigil maintains that this error requires a new

trial.
In responding to Mr. Vigil's contention that the trial
court should have instructed the jury in accordance with the good
faith defenses codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402,9 the State

9

Section 76-6-402 provides in relevant subpart,
.... (3) It is a defense under this part that the
actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right
to the property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he
had the right to obtain or exercise control
over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over
the property or service honestly believing
that the owner, if present, would have
consented.

13

contends that the trial court and trial counsel may have
reasonably omitted this Instruction because it was inconsistent
with the Vigils' defense that they had no intent to deceive the
prospective adoptive parents, but were motivated to seek out new
prospective adoptive parents because of difficulties with
attorneys Bushman and Giffen.

State's brief at 47-50.

In

support of this argument, the State speculates that trial counsel
and the trial court may have been trying to avoid two nonsensical
defense arguments created by the State in support of its position
on appeal.10
Rather than defeating the Vigils' defense, the good
faith defenses provided by the statute complemented the defense.
The argument presented by trial counsel was that because the
Vigils were truthfully seeking out prospective adoptive parents
in three successive couples, and had received legal advice that
money provided by prospective adoptive couples was a charitable

The hypothetical arguments appear on page 48 of the State's
brief as follow:
For instance, counsel may have determined that an
argument under section 76-6-402(3) (a) might confuse the
jury by implying defendant was arguing that even if

defendant

did knowingly or intentionally

deceive

the

victims
he nonetheless was justified in believing he
was acting "under an honest claim of right."
Similarly, counsel may have feared that an argument
under subsection b would have implied that defendant
believed that "he had the right to obtain or exercise
control over the [victims'] property" even if he had to
mislead the victims in order to get them to make a
"charitable contribution" under section 76-7-203.
14

contribution, the Vigils accepted all of the money paid to them
in good faith (R. 750-753; 1292-1307). Contrary to the
hypothetical arguments created by the State, Mr. Vigil's defense
never encompassed a concession that Mr. Vigil knowingly or
intentionally deceived the prospective adoptive parents, or
misled them.
The failure to instruct the jury on the good faith
defenses was prejudicial because there were no defense
Instructions given.

Given the evidence concerning legal advice

to the Vigils that the money was considered a charitable
contribution, and the evidence that the Vigils sought out
additional prospective adoptive couples after having had
difficulties with the first two adoption attorneys, the jurors
may have acquitting the Vigils had they been informed of the good
faith defenses provided by Utah law.
Trial counsel's failure to request the Instructions on
the absence of pecuniary significance and on the good faith
defenses, as provided by statute, and the trial court's failure
to instruct the jury in accordance with this law constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error, which this
Court should address on appeal by granting Mr. Vigil a new trial.
See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122
n.12 (Utah 1989); State v. Moritzky, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App.
1989) .

15

V.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS CANNOT
BE THE OBJECT OF THEFT BY DECEPTION.

The State argues that a prospective adoptive couples'
charitable contributions to the Vigils can be the object of theft
by deception, because the prospective adoptive parents parted
with their charitable contributions in reliance on the Vigils'
deceitful representations that they intended to give up their
child for adoption.

State's brief at 28-32, 35-36.

Because this interpretation of the prospective adoptive
parents' contributions renders the contributions conditional, it
seems inconsistent with the law requiring the contributions to be
charitable donations.11
Assuming arguendo that the State is correct, the
charitable contributions still cannot be the object of theft by
deception because the Vigils' representations that they intended
to give up their child for adoption had no pecuniary
significance.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2)("Theft by

Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-203 provides,
Any person, while having custody, care, control,
or possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of,
or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
However, this section does not prohibit any person,
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of
the mother preceding and during confinement as an act
of charity, so long as payment is not made for the
purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or legal
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an
adoption.
16

deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as
to matters having no pecuniary significance . . . " ) .
Because the facts at issue here cannot constitute the
crime of theft by deception under Utah law, this Court should
order this case dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Vigil requests that this case be dismissed.

In the

alternative, he seeks a new trial, wherein the voir dire is
adequate, the jury is instructed properly, and he is allowed to
present his full defense.
DATED this ^

day of April, 1996

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Mr. Vigil
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APPENDIX I

1

mistaken, there is a likelihood that this particular case

2

received media exposure.

3

this particular time, and I will give you an opportunity

4

to search your memory, members of the jury panel, whether

5

or not any member of the jury panel recalls reading or

6

seeing on television or hearing on the radio anything

7

regarding this particular case?

8

please just indicate this by raising your hand at this

9

time.

(Pause)

What I would like to know at

The record may reflect that there are two

10

hands raised:

11

Anderson has her hand raised.

12

Floor and Ms. Anderson.

13

And if so, would you

Ms. Floor has her hand raised and Ms.
Thank you very much, Ms.

Now, let me also ask somewhat of a related

14

question, members of the jury panel.

I would like to

15

know at this time whether or not any member of the jury

16

panel has seen any recent television programs or received

17

any other information depicting attempted adoptions?

18

me restate that.

19

of the panel has seen any recent television programs or

20

received any other information depicting attempted

21

adoptions.

22

raising your hand at this time and keep those hands up

23

there long enough for me so I can see who has their hand

24

raised.

25

her hand and Mr. Jerman has his hand raised.

Let

I would like to know whether any member

And if so, would you please indicate this by

Mr. Pepper has his hand raised and Ms. Wylie has
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1

And, Mr, Pepper, again, I might cut you off

2

here.

3

or saw.

Identify for me what program you think you heard

4
5

MR. PEPPER:

It was one of the news magazine

shows.

6

THE COURT:

How long ago?

7

MR. PEPPER:

Last week.

8

THE COURT:

9

Thank you very much, Mr. Pepper.

And, Ms. Wylie, what program was it?

10

MS. WYLIE:

I don't know.

11

THE COURT:

How long ago was that?

12

MS. WYLIE:

Within six months and then in the

13

Just a documentary.

Ladies Home Journal I think there was an article too.

14

THE COURT:

Do you recall the subject matter of

15

the documentary or the article in the Ladies Home

16

Journal?

17
18

MS. WYLIE:

they changed their mind.

•19
20

I dust know its adoption and then

THE COURT:

Was that the subject matter of

those issues?

21

MS. WYLIE:

Uh-huh.

22

THE COURT:

Let me ask you this question, Ms.

23

Wylie.

As a result of the documentary or the article in

24

the magazine, and considering the nature of today's case,

25

would any of that information interfere with your
98
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1

responsibility to be fair and impartial?

2

MS. WYLIE:

No, not really.

3

THE.COURT:

You are certain you could remain

4

fair and impartial to both sides of this case?

5

MS. WYLIE:

I think, yes.

6

THE COURT:

Obviously, you use the word

7
8
9
10
11

"think."

Do you have a hesitation?
MS. WYLIE:

detail, you know.

I don't remember the story in that

I think I can listen impartially.

THE COURT:

Thank you very much, Ms. Wylie.

Mr. Jerman, you had your hand raised.

12

MR. JERMAN:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. JERMAN:

Yes.
What program was it, sir?
I am not sure.

I can't recall

15

whether it was a documentary or a news report.

16

place we stay in in Arizona occasionally.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. JERMAN:

19

THE COURT:

We have a

How long ago was it?
This winter.
Was it an incident —

20

involve a situation in Arizona?

21

MR. JERMAN:

22

THE COURT:

Did it

No, I thought it was a national.
Would that exposure to that

23

information prevent you from being fair and impartial to

24

either side of this lawsuit?

25

MR. JERMAN:

No.
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1

THE COURT:

Thank you very much, Mr. Jerman.

2

The record may reflect that there is an additional hand

3

raised.

4

raised?

5

Just one second.

MS. REESE:

Yes.

Ms. Reese, you have your hand

I watched a television

6

program documentary within the last three months

7

"Attempted Adoption."

8

THE COURT:

Do you remember the thrust or major

9

points of the program you saw?

10

MS. REESE:

The major thing was that the child

11

was up for adoption and then their minds were changed and

12

the natural parents got the child back.

13

THE COURT:

Would any of that information

14

interfere with your abilities to be fair and impartial to

15

both sides of this lawsuit, Ms. Reese?

16

MS. REESE:

No.

17

THE COURT:

Mr. Jones, Mr. Brown and Mr.

18

Scowcroft, would the three of you approach the bench for

19

a moment, please.

20
21
22

(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)
THE COURT:

Mr. Jones, with the exception of

23

the conversation we had at side bar, do you pass the

24

panel for cause, sir?

25

MR. JONES: Yes.
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